What Do We Learn by Viewing the First Sino-Japanese War as a Watershed Moment?
Song-Chuan Chen (University of Warwick)
Published 2025
The Republican Revolution of 1911 has long been considered a watershed moment in the periodization of modern Chinese history. However, this historiographical marker appears increasingly questionable in the wake of the decolonization movement of Chinese history. In its place, the Qing dynasty’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 has emerged as a strong contender for a more meaningful marker of periodization. In this article, I will outline why the 1911 revolution, as a marker, embodies both Eurocentric and Sino-centric viewpoints of history. And, in contrast, how the First Sino-Japanese War offers a global history perspective that brings into focus both China’s internal dynamics and the regional and global geopolitics at the turn of the twentieth century.
To be sure, the 1911 Revolution remains a seismic event in history, as it ended the Qing empire, which was first established in 1636. However, the revolution did not lead to the establishment of a stable republic in China. The nearly four decades of instability that ensued were characterized by competition between two major contenders for power: the Nationalist Party (KMT, Kuomintang), which sought to build a republic in China, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in 1921 with the goal of establishing a communist state. During this period, numerous warlords controlled one or several provinces, waging wars with each other and allying with the KMT, CCP (or even both) or foreign powers such as Japan and Russia. Some of these warlords even attempted to restore dynastic rule and declared themselves emperors. The political landscape was marked by fragmentation and chaos rather than the cohesive establishment of a republic. If any meaningful republic had emerged from the revolution, it was in Taiwan, where the Republic of China (established after the 1911 revolution) relocated after the KMT was defeated by the CCP in 1949. Taiwan became a true democracy in the late 1990s, although the question of whether Taiwan is part of China remains highly contentious.[1]
Why, then, has the period between 1911 and 1949 been called the Republican period? This designation reflects the KMT’s perspective of history and represents a liberal-democratic, or Whiggish, historiography. This perspective is Eurocentric, viewing history as inevitably progressing toward a liberal democratic order similar to that achieved by Western Europe. Terms such as ‘modern’ and ‘modernity’ embody this viewpoint. While democracy as a form of political formation remains a noble aspiration and possibly the best direction for the globalizing world, history writing cannot be reduced to a mere footnote in the story of democratic progress. It must engage with the complexity and nuance of historical experiences and structural shifts.
The 1911 Revolution gave the impression of an undeniable watershed moment in history. Yet, in reality, the political dynamics before and after it were marked by continuity. In the half-century leading up to the revolution, the Qing dynasty faced imperial invasions starting with the First Opium War (1839–1842) and significant domestic rebellions, most notably the Taiping Uprising (1850–1864). The Qing responded by militarizing the nation, culminating in the formation of the New Army in 1902, which was placed under the command of Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), making him the de facto most powerful man in the country. When the 1911 Revolution occurred, it was Yuan, not the nominal leader of the revolutionaries, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), who assumed the presidency of the newly established Republic of China.
Yuan Shikai also symbolized the continuity of the devolution of political power from the Qing central government to provincial governments, a process that began during the Taiping Uprising. [2]After Yuan’s sudden death in the summer of 1916, regional governments evolved into warlord factions vying for military supremacy.
Chiang Kai-shek’s efforts to defeat the warlords and unify China under the KMT after Sun Yat-sen’s death in 1925 also reflect the ongoing dominance of militarism. Despite winning wars and achieving successes in consolidating power in the south, Chiang’s government in Nanjing never established complete control over the entire country. This was evident in the continued presence and influence of warlords and the growing strength of the CCP. The KMT’s reliance on military force rather than democratic governance further underscores the limited transformation from the Qing dynasty to the Republic of China.
The 1911 Revolution, as a periodization marker, reflects not only a Whiggish historiography but also a Sino-centric perspective that classifies Chinese history before the revolution as dynastic. According to this narrative, first established by generations of Chinese historians tracing their lineage back to the second century BCE, there were twenty-four orthodox dynasties. This view holds that the Mandate of Heaven passed from one dynasty to the next, defining what constituted China. Non-Han Chinese, such as the Qing, established by the Manchurians, were perceived as outsiders who underwent Sinicization to integrate into the Chinese dynastic framework.[3]
This narrative has fostered the misconception that China has been a cohesive political entity for more than two thousand years. In reality, the territories covered by each of the so-called ‘dynasties’ varied significantly. For instance, the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), which was actually a Mongol empire, extended its influence as far as Eastern Europe and South Asia. In contrast, the Southern and Northern Dynasties period (420–589) saw China fragmented into multiple kingdoms, each with its own distinct administration and cultural practices. Furthermore, the classification of twenty-four orthodox dynasties is a historiographical construct that does not account for the numerous other regimes that coexisted or competed for power throughout China’s history. Some historians count over fifty dynasties and regimes when considering local governments and short-lived states. This broader perspective reveals a more fragmented and dynamic historical reality.
James Millward argues that a more inclusive narrative would be to view the various so-called dynasties of China as ‘distinct empires or kingdoms.’[4] This perspective, informed by the findings of the and scholars like Nicola Di Cosmo, challenges the long-standing myth of a singular Chinese civilization. For instance, the New Qing History posits that the Qing dynasty’s ruling elite not only preserved their Manchu identity throughout their reign but also actively promoted an ethnically diverse empire. This perspective counters the earlier view that the Qing were so thoroughly Sinicized that they became indistinguishable from a traditional Chinese dynasty.[5]
Viewing the dynasties as distinct empires and kingdoms competing for political dominance unveils a more intricate historical landscape. From this perspective, the Qing rulers are seen as Manchurian emperors that adopted the Han Chinese narrative to legitimize their rule over parts of their vast territory. This narrative held that a ruler’s legitimacy was granted by a divine force, dependent on their ability to govern justly and effectively, and could be revoked if they failed in these duties. At the same time, the Qing employed the concept of their emperors as incarnations of Bodhisattvas to assert authority over the Tibetan and Mongolian populations they conquered in the eighteenth century. Thus, the idea of continuous Chinese dynastic rule was a constructed narrative that did not fully reflect historical realities but rather served the legitimization efforts of various regimes.
In this context, the 1911 Revolution can be seen as introducing a new form of political legitimacy influenced by Western models, yet it fell short of achieving its intended goals. While it succeeded in toppling the Qing empire, it did not establish a stable political order. Instead, it ignited a period of intense competition among various factions, including restorationists and communists. During this time, regions like Mongolia and Tibet seized the chance to assert their independence.
The 1911 Revolution, rather than being a singularly decisive event, represents the culmination of a broader momentum that began with the Qing’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895. While 1911 marked the eruption of revolutionary fervour, the underlying shifts in politico-economic and sociocultural structures had been in motion since 1895. Consequently, the earlier event of 1895 serves as a more compelling marker for understanding this transformative period in Chinese history.
The catastrophic defeat by Japan in 1895 reverberated throughout China, signaling a profound crisis. Even before the war ended and the full extent of the Qing’s losses became apparent, the first revolutionary organization, the Revive China Society (Xinzhong Hui), was founded on November 24, 1894, in Honolulu by overseas Chinese.[6] This was followed by the emergence of several other revolutionary groups, which eventually coalesced into the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmen Hui) in Tokyo in 1905.
Most of these revolutionaries in Japan were students who had traveled there to study in the wake of the war, impressed by Japan’s successful adoption of Western methods. The number of Chinese students in Japan surged from 120 in 1899 to 9,000 by 1905.[7] The revolutionary ideas nurtured by these overseas Chinese in Japan laid the foundation for the 1911 Revolution. The Revolutionary Alliance established by these figures would later evolve into the Nationalist Party, which continues to be a prominent political force in Taiwan.
Back in Beijing, the shock of the 1895 defeat prompted a petition from civil service examination candidates who opposed the Qing government’s decision to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which they perceived as humiliating. This petition highlighted not only the defeat by Japan but also the failure of the Qing’s earlier reforms—particularly the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1898)—to address the empire’s decline since the end of the Second Opium War in 1860. Leading figures of the petition, Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929), became central to the Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898, which sought to implement radical political changes. However, this reform movement abruptly ended after just over three months due to a palace coup that ousted the reform-minded Guangxu emperor.
Less than two years later, Empress Dowager Cixi, who had placed Guangxu under house arrest to thwart his reform efforts, introduced the New Policies. These policies signalled a significant transformation in both politics and society. Among the most notable changes was the abolition in 1905 of the long-standing Civil Service Examinations, a system that had been used for selecting national and local officials across various Chinese dynasties and empires since the seventh century. The examinations were replaced with a new education system that integrated both traditional and Western humanities subjects, alongside scientific disciplines. This reform laid the groundwork for profound sociocultural shifts.
Rather than salvaging the Qing empire, the constitutional monarchy introduced by the New Policies only further exposed its inherent weaknesses, intensifying the demand for substantial political reform. The local assemblies established during the reform enhanced the power of regional governments, accelerating the trend of political devolution that had begun during the Taiping Uprising. These developments set the stage for the rise of warlordism following Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916.
The defeat in 1895 not only transformed Qing society and domestic politics but also had significant repercussions for regional and global dynamics. Sarah C. Paine has described the war as a ‘seminal event’ that has profoundly influenced East Asian geopolitics ever since.[8]
The Qing empire’s defeat sparked a renewed scramble for imperial rights among foreign powers. Within three months of the Qing signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki in March 1895, France expanded its territorial ambitions by extending its influence along the northern border of Vietnam (Indochina), which had been a French colony since 1884. Additionally, France secured mining and railway rights in southern provinces and leased Guangzhou Bay, thereby solidifying its sphere of influence in the areas contiguous to its Indochina colony.[9]
In the wake of the Qing’s defeat, Germany seized the opportunity to expand its influence by acquiring concessions in the seaport of Tianjin and the strategic Yangzi River city of Hankou. Additionally, Germany secured Jiaozhou Bay and Qingdao, along with mining and railway rights in Shandong province. Meanwhile, Russia obtained railway rights and took control of Port Arthur. Britain also entered the imperial scramble, securing trading, mining, and railway rights and taking control of the seaport of Weihaiwei to counterbalance Russia’s influence at Port Arthur. Moreover, Britain pressured the Qing to acknowledge the Yangtze River basin as its sphere of influence. Minor powers like the United States and Belgium also acquired mining and railway rights, further fragmenting control in the region.[10]
The scramble for imperial control following the Qing empire’s defeat in 1895 exacerbated anti-Manchu sentiment and deepened the sense of national crisis. The Qing were increasingly seen as unable to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, intensifying demands for reform and revolutionary change.
In stark contrast, Japan’s victory in 1895 significantly enhanced its regional and global status. The Treaty of Shimonoseki not only ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands to Japan but also ended Qing suzerainty over Korea. Korea quickly fell under Japanese influence, becoming a Japanese protectorate and was formally annexed as a colony in 1910.
Japan’s ascent as a global power was marked by a dramatic transformation in its status, emerging as both a major imperial power and a modern nation. In 1890, a British observer noted that Japan was ‘the only nation in the Orient which has shown itself possessed of the true instinct of civilized progress.’[11] This idea of ‘civilized progress’ was closely linked to Japan’s military successes. The impressive performance of the Japanese navy during the First Sino-Japanese War led Britain to view Japan as a significant challenge to its naval dominance. As a result, Britain heavily invested in expanding its own naval capabilities to safeguard its Asian colonies and, acknowledging Japan’s rising influence, formed a strategic alliance with Japan in 1902—the only such alliance Britain established at that time.[12]
Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War set the stage for a competitive struggle with Russia for regional supremacy. With Korea firmly under its control, Japan turned its attention to Manchuria, the Qing’s ancestral homeland, as its next strategic objective. The ensuing Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) decisively resolved this competition by establishing Manchuria as Japan’s sphere of influence. Japan’s triumph over a European power significantly enhanced its regional dominance and cemented its status as a major global player.
The victory of 1895 marked the beginning of a trajectory toward increased militarization for Japan, driven by the need to manage domestic challenges arising from reforms and to assert its power on the international stage. This path of expansionism led to escalating imperial aggression in East Asia, ultimately culminating in the Second Sino-Japanese War, which many historians trace back to Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1931.
Viewing the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895 as a watershed moment provides profound insights into the transformation of East Asia and global geopolitics. As Evan N. Dawley suggests, periodization is a form of power that influences how historical narratives are constructed.[13] When the 1911 Revolution is used as a periodization marker, it promotes a Eurocentric view of history that highlights liberal democratic progress. It also reinforces a Sino-centric narrative that portrays China as a monolithic entity under a continuous dynastic framework.
In contrast, using 1895 as a periodization marker shifts the focus away from both Eurocentric and Sino-centric historiography, as well as from a purely state-centered perspective. This approach highlights the continuity from 1895 to the end of World War II, a period characterized by significant global militarization. It encompasses the roles of the Qing, Japan, and early twentieth-century China in this broader development. While the 1911 marker suggests a narrative of democratization, the 1895 perspective does not necessarily imply such a linear trajectory for modern Chinese history. [14]
Instead of confining historical analysis to nationalistic or state-centered narratives, as the 1911 marker does, focusing on 1895 and the subsequent decades provides a more comprehensive perspective. This approach places China within a transregional and cross-cultural framework, demonstrating how its historical trajectory intersected with the broader evolution of global geopolitics.[15]
Notes
[1] For a summary of this period’s history, see Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (Norton: 1990).
[2] Edward A. McCord, The Power of the Gun: The emergence of modern Chinese warlordism (University of California Press, 1993).
[3] James A. Millward, “How ‘Chinese Dynasties’ Periodization Works with the ‘Tribute System’ and ‘Sinicization’ to Erase Diversity and Euphemize Colonialism in Historiography of China”, The Historical Journal 67:1 (2024), pp. 151-60 and “We Need a New Approach to Teaching Modern Chinese History: We Have Lazily Repeated False Narratives for Too Long”, Medium (accessed 16 July 2024).
[4] Millward, “We Need a New Approach to Teaching Modern Chinese History”.
[5] Nicola Di Cosmo, “State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History”, Journal of World History, 10:1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 1-40 and Joanna Waley-Cohen, “The New Qing History”, Radical History Review 88 (2004), pp. 193-206.
[6] Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-Sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution (University of California Press, 2020), p. 41.
[7] Huang Fu-ch’ing 黄福慶, Qingmo liu Ri xuesheng 清末留日學生 [Chinese students in Japan during the late Qing dynasty], (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 1975).
[8] Sarah C. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, power, and primacy (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 3.
[9] Ibid., pp. 305-6.
[10] Ibid., pp. 308-9.
[11] Ibid., p. 15.
[12] Ibid., pp. 7-8.
[13] Evan N. Dawley, “Finding Meaning in Time and Space: Periodisation and Taiwanese-centric history”, International Journal of Taiwan Studies 1:2 (2018), pp. 245-72; citation pp. 248-9.
[14] John W. Steinberg argued that the Russo-Japanese War was a precursor to World War I. It can be noted that the First Sino-Japanese War set the stage for the Russo-Japanese War. See “Was the Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?”, The Russian Review 67:1 (2008), pp. 1-7.
[15] This global perspective in periodization is well argued by Jerry Bentley in his seminal article “Cross-Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World History”, The American Historical Review, 101:3 (June 1996), pp. 749-70.
Bibliography
Bentley, Jerry, “Cross-Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World History”, The American Historical Review 101:3 (June 1996).
Dawley, Evan N., “Finding Meaning in Time and Space: Periodisation and Taiwanese-centric history”, International Journal of Taiwan Studies 1:2 (2018).
Di Cosmo, Nicola, “State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History”, Journal of World History 10:1 (Spring 1999).
Huang Fu-ch’ing 黄福慶, Qingmo liu Ri xuesheng 清末留日學生 [Chinese students in Japan during the late Qing dynasty], (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 1975).
McCord, Edward A., The Power of the Gun: The emergence of modern Chinese warlordism (University of California Press, 1993).
Millward, James A., “How ‘Chinese Dynasties’ Periodization Works with the ‘Tribute System’ and ‘Sinicization’ to Erase Diversity and Euphemize Colonialism in Historiography of China”, The Historical Journal 67:1 (2024).
Millward, James A., “We Need a New Approach to Teaching Modern Chinese History: We Have Lazily Repeated False Narratives for Too Long”. Medium (online blog accessed 16 July 2024).
Paine, Sarah C., The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, power, and primacy (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Schiffrin, Harold Z., Sun Yat-Sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution (University of California Press, 2020).
Spence, Jonathan D., The Search for Modern China (Norton: 1990).
Steinberg, Jonathan W., “Was the Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?” The Russian Review 67, no. 1 (2008).
Waley-Cohen, Joanna, “The New Qing History”, Radical History Review 88 (2004).
What Do We Learn by Viewing the First Sino-Japanese War as a Watershed Moment?
Song-Chuan Chen (University of Warwick)
Published 2025
The Republican Revolution of 1911 has long been considered a watershed moment in the periodization of modern Chinese history. However, this historiographical marker appears increasingly questionable in the wake of the decolonization movement of Chinese history. In its place, the Qing dynasty’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 has emerged as a strong contender for a more meaningful marker of periodization. In this article, I will outline why the 1911 revolution, as a marker, embodies both Eurocentric and Sino-centric viewpoints of history. And, in contrast, how the First Sino-Japanese War offers a global history perspective that brings into focus both China’s internal dynamics and the regional and global geopolitics at the turn of the twentieth century.
To be sure, the 1911 Revolution remains a seismic event in history, as it ended the Qing empire, which was first established in 1636. However, the revolution did not lead to the establishment of a stable republic in China. The nearly four decades of instability that ensued were characterized by competition between two major contenders for power: the Nationalist Party (KMT, Kuomintang), which sought to build a republic in China, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in 1921 with the goal of establishing a communist state. During this period, numerous warlords controlled one or several provinces, waging wars with each other and allying with the KMT, CCP (or even both) or foreign powers such as Japan and Russia. Some of these warlords even attempted to restore dynastic rule and declared themselves emperors. The political landscape was marked by fragmentation and chaos rather than the cohesive establishment of a republic. If any meaningful republic had emerged from the revolution, it was in Taiwan, where the Republic of China (established after the 1911 revolution) relocated after the KMT was defeated by the CCP in 1949. Taiwan became a true democracy in the late 1990s, although the question of whether Taiwan is part of China remains highly contentious.[1]
Why, then, has the period between 1911 and 1949 been called the Republican period? This designation reflects the KMT’s perspective of history and represents a liberal-democratic, or Whiggish, historiography. This perspective is Eurocentric, viewing history as inevitably progressing toward a liberal democratic order similar to that achieved by Western Europe. Terms such as ‘modern’ and ‘modernity’ embody this viewpoint. While democracy as a form of political formation remains a noble aspiration and possibly the best direction for the globalizing world, history writing cannot be reduced to a mere footnote in the story of democratic progress. It must engage with the complexity and nuance of historical experiences and structural shifts.
The 1911 Revolution gave the impression of an undeniable watershed moment in history. Yet, in reality, the political dynamics before and after it were marked by continuity. In the half-century leading up to the revolution, the Qing dynasty faced imperial invasions starting with the First Opium War (1839–1842) and significant domestic rebellions, most notably the Taiping Uprising (1850–1864). The Qing responded by militarizing the nation, culminating in the formation of the New Army in 1902, which was placed under the command of Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), making him the de facto most powerful man in the country. When the 1911 Revolution occurred, it was Yuan, not the nominal leader of the revolutionaries, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), who assumed the presidency of the newly established Republic of China.
Yuan Shikai also symbolized the continuity of the devolution of political power from the Qing central government to provincial governments, a process that began during the Taiping Uprising. [2]After Yuan’s sudden death in the summer of 1916, regional governments evolved into warlord factions vying for military supremacy.
Chiang Kai-shek’s efforts to defeat the warlords and unify China under the KMT after Sun Yat-sen’s death in 1925 also reflect the ongoing dominance of militarism. Despite winning wars and achieving successes in consolidating power in the south, Chiang’s government in Nanjing never established complete control over the entire country. This was evident in the continued presence and influence of warlords and the growing strength of the CCP. The KMT’s reliance on military force rather than democratic governance further underscores the limited transformation from the Qing dynasty to the Republic of China.
The 1911 Revolution, as a periodization marker, reflects not only a Whiggish historiography but also a Sino-centric perspective that classifies Chinese history before the revolution as dynastic. According to this narrative, first established by generations of Chinese historians tracing their lineage back to the second century BCE, there were twenty-four orthodox dynasties. This view holds that the Mandate of Heaven passed from one dynasty to the next, defining what constituted China. Non-Han Chinese, such as the Qing, established by the Manchurians, were perceived as outsiders who underwent Sinicization to integrate into the Chinese dynastic framework.[3]
This narrative has fostered the misconception that China has been a cohesive political entity for more than two thousand years. In reality, the territories covered by each of the so-called ‘dynasties’ varied significantly. For instance, the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), which was actually a Mongol empire, extended its influence as far as Eastern Europe and South Asia. In contrast, the Southern and Northern Dynasties period (420–589) saw China fragmented into multiple kingdoms, each with its own distinct administration and cultural practices. Furthermore, the classification of twenty-four orthodox dynasties is a historiographical construct that does not account for the numerous other regimes that coexisted or competed for power throughout China’s history. Some historians count over fifty dynasties and regimes when considering local governments and short-lived states. This broader perspective reveals a more fragmented and dynamic historical reality.
James Millward argues that a more inclusive narrative would be to view the various so-called dynasties of China as ‘distinct empires or kingdoms.’[4] This perspective, informed by the findings of the and scholars like Nicola Di Cosmo, challenges the long-standing myth of a singular Chinese civilization. For instance, the New Qing History posits that the Qing dynasty’s ruling elite not only preserved their Manchu identity throughout their reign but also actively promoted an ethnically diverse empire. This perspective counters the earlier view that the Qing were so thoroughly Sinicized that they became indistinguishable from a traditional Chinese dynasty.[5]
Viewing the dynasties as distinct empires and kingdoms competing for political dominance unveils a more intricate historical landscape. From this perspective, the Qing rulers are seen as Manchurian emperors that adopted the Han Chinese narrative to legitimize their rule over parts of their vast territory. This narrative held that a ruler’s legitimacy was granted by a divine force, dependent on their ability to govern justly and effectively, and could be revoked if they failed in these duties. At the same time, the Qing employed the concept of their emperors as incarnations of Bodhisattvas to assert authority over the Tibetan and Mongolian populations they conquered in the eighteenth century. Thus, the idea of continuous Chinese dynastic rule was a constructed narrative that did not fully reflect historical realities but rather served the legitimization efforts of various regimes.
In this context, the 1911 Revolution can be seen as introducing a new form of political legitimacy influenced by Western models, yet it fell short of achieving its intended goals. While it succeeded in toppling the Qing empire, it did not establish a stable political order. Instead, it ignited a period of intense competition among various factions, including restorationists and communists. During this time, regions like Mongolia and Tibet seized the chance to assert their independence.
The 1911 Revolution, rather than being a singularly decisive event, represents the culmination of a broader momentum that began with the Qing’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895. While 1911 marked the eruption of revolutionary fervour, the underlying shifts in politico-economic and sociocultural structures had been in motion since 1895. Consequently, the earlier event of 1895 serves as a more compelling marker for understanding this transformative period in Chinese history.
The catastrophic defeat by Japan in 1895 reverberated throughout China, signaling a profound crisis. Even before the war ended and the full extent of the Qing’s losses became apparent, the first revolutionary organization, the Revive China Society (Xinzhong Hui), was founded on November 24, 1894, in Honolulu by overseas Chinese.[6] This was followed by the emergence of several other revolutionary groups, which eventually coalesced into the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmen Hui) in Tokyo in 1905.
Most of these revolutionaries in Japan were students who had traveled there to study in the wake of the war, impressed by Japan’s successful adoption of Western methods. The number of Chinese students in Japan surged from 120 in 1899 to 9,000 by 1905.[7] The revolutionary ideas nurtured by these overseas Chinese in Japan laid the foundation for the 1911 Revolution. The Revolutionary Alliance established by these figures would later evolve into the Nationalist Party, which continues to be a prominent political force in Taiwan.
Back in Beijing, the shock of the 1895 defeat prompted a petition from civil service examination candidates who opposed the Qing government’s decision to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which they perceived as humiliating. This petition highlighted not only the defeat by Japan but also the failure of the Qing’s earlier reforms—particularly the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1898)—to address the empire’s decline since the end of the Second Opium War in 1860. Leading figures of the petition, Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929), became central to the Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898, which sought to implement radical political changes. However, this reform movement abruptly ended after just over three months due to a palace coup that ousted the reform-minded Guangxu emperor.
Less than two years later, Empress Dowager Cixi, who had placed Guangxu under house arrest to thwart his reform efforts, introduced the New Policies. These policies signalled a significant transformation in both politics and society. Among the most notable changes was the abolition in 1905 of the long-standing Civil Service Examinations, a system that had been used for selecting national and local officials across various Chinese dynasties and empires since the seventh century. The examinations were replaced with a new education system that integrated both traditional and Western humanities subjects, alongside scientific disciplines. This reform laid the groundwork for profound sociocultural shifts.
Rather than salvaging the Qing empire, the constitutional monarchy introduced by the New Policies only further exposed its inherent weaknesses, intensifying the demand for substantial political reform. The local assemblies established during the reform enhanced the power of regional governments, accelerating the trend of political devolution that had begun during the Taiping Uprising. These developments set the stage for the rise of warlordism following Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916.
The defeat in 1895 not only transformed Qing society and domestic politics but also had significant repercussions for regional and global dynamics. Sarah C. Paine has described the war as a ‘seminal event’ that has profoundly influenced East Asian geopolitics ever since.[8]
The Qing empire’s defeat sparked a renewed scramble for imperial rights among foreign powers. Within three months of the Qing signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki in March 1895, France expanded its territorial ambitions by extending its influence along the northern border of Vietnam (Indochina), which had been a French colony since 1884. Additionally, France secured mining and railway rights in southern provinces and leased Guangzhou Bay, thereby solidifying its sphere of influence in the areas contiguous to its Indochina colony.[9]
In the wake of the Qing’s defeat, Germany seized the opportunity to expand its influence by acquiring concessions in the seaport of Tianjin and the strategic Yangzi River city of Hankou. Additionally, Germany secured Jiaozhou Bay and Qingdao, along with mining and railway rights in Shandong province. Meanwhile, Russia obtained railway rights and took control of Port Arthur. Britain also entered the imperial scramble, securing trading, mining, and railway rights and taking control of the seaport of Weihaiwei to counterbalance Russia’s influence at Port Arthur. Moreover, Britain pressured the Qing to acknowledge the Yangtze River basin as its sphere of influence. Minor powers like the United States and Belgium also acquired mining and railway rights, further fragmenting control in the region.[10]
The scramble for imperial control following the Qing empire’s defeat in 1895 exacerbated anti-Manchu sentiment and deepened the sense of national crisis. The Qing were increasingly seen as unable to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, intensifying demands for reform and revolutionary change.
In stark contrast, Japan’s victory in 1895 significantly enhanced its regional and global status. The Treaty of Shimonoseki not only ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands to Japan but also ended Qing suzerainty over Korea. Korea quickly fell under Japanese influence, becoming a Japanese protectorate and was formally annexed as a colony in 1910.
Japan’s ascent as a global power was marked by a dramatic transformation in its status, emerging as both a major imperial power and a modern nation. In 1890, a British observer noted that Japan was ‘the only nation in the Orient which has shown itself possessed of the true instinct of civilized progress.’[11] This idea of ‘civilized progress’ was closely linked to Japan’s military successes. The impressive performance of the Japanese navy during the First Sino-Japanese War led Britain to view Japan as a significant challenge to its naval dominance. As a result, Britain heavily invested in expanding its own naval capabilities to safeguard its Asian colonies and, acknowledging Japan’s rising influence, formed a strategic alliance with Japan in 1902—the only such alliance Britain established at that time.[12]
Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War set the stage for a competitive struggle with Russia for regional supremacy. With Korea firmly under its control, Japan turned its attention to Manchuria, the Qing’s ancestral homeland, as its next strategic objective. The ensuing Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) decisively resolved this competition by establishing Manchuria as Japan’s sphere of influence. Japan’s triumph over a European power significantly enhanced its regional dominance and cemented its status as a major global player.
The victory of 1895 marked the beginning of a trajectory toward increased militarization for Japan, driven by the need to manage domestic challenges arising from reforms and to assert its power on the international stage. This path of expansionism led to escalating imperial aggression in East Asia, ultimately culminating in the Second Sino-Japanese War, which many historians trace back to Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1931.
Viewing the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895 as a watershed moment provides profound insights into the transformation of East Asia and global geopolitics. As Evan N. Dawley suggests, periodization is a form of power that influences how historical narratives are constructed.[13] When the 1911 Revolution is used as a periodization marker, it promotes a Eurocentric view of history that highlights liberal democratic progress. It also reinforces a Sino-centric narrative that portrays China as a monolithic entity under a continuous dynastic framework.
In contrast, using 1895 as a periodization marker shifts the focus away from both Eurocentric and Sino-centric historiography, as well as from a purely state-centered perspective. This approach highlights the continuity from 1895 to the end of World War II, a period characterized by significant global militarization. It encompasses the roles of the Qing, Japan, and early twentieth-century China in this broader development. While the 1911 marker suggests a narrative of democratization, the 1895 perspective does not necessarily imply such a linear trajectory for modern Chinese history. [14]
Instead of confining historical analysis to nationalistic or state-centered narratives, as the 1911 marker does, focusing on 1895 and the subsequent decades provides a more comprehensive perspective. This approach places China within a transregional and cross-cultural framework, demonstrating how its historical trajectory intersected with the broader evolution of global geopolitics.[15]
Notes
[1] For a summary of this period’s history, see Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (Norton: 1990).
[2] Edward A. McCord, The Power of the Gun: The emergence of modern Chinese warlordism (University of California Press, 1993).
[3] James A. Millward, “How ‘Chinese Dynasties’ Periodization Works with the ‘Tribute System’ and ‘Sinicization’ to Erase Diversity and Euphemize Colonialism in Historiography of China”, The Historical Journal 67:1 (2024), pp. 151-60 and “We Need a New Approach to Teaching Modern Chinese History: We Have Lazily Repeated False Narratives for Too Long”, Medium (accessed 16 July 2024).
[4] Millward, “We Need a New Approach to Teaching Modern Chinese History”.
[5] Nicola Di Cosmo, “State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History”, Journal of World History, 10:1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 1-40 and Joanna Waley-Cohen, “The New Qing History”, Radical History Review 88 (2004), pp. 193-206.
[6] Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-Sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution (University of California Press, 2020), p. 41.
[7] Huang Fu-ch’ing 黄福慶, Qingmo liu Ri xuesheng 清末留日學生 [Chinese students in Japan during the late Qing dynasty], (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 1975).
[8] Sarah C. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, power, and primacy (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 3.
[9] Ibid., pp. 305-6.
[10] Ibid., pp. 308-9.
[11] Ibid., p. 15.
[12] Ibid., pp. 7-8.
[13] Evan N. Dawley, “Finding Meaning in Time and Space: Periodisation and Taiwanese-centric history”, International Journal of Taiwan Studies 1:2 (2018), pp. 245-72; citation pp. 248-9.
[14] John W. Steinberg argued that the Russo-Japanese War was a precursor to World War I. It can be noted that the First Sino-Japanese War set the stage for the Russo-Japanese War. See “Was the Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?”, The Russian Review 67:1 (2008), pp. 1-7.
[15] This global perspective in periodization is well argued by Jerry Bentley in his seminal article “Cross-Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World History”, The American Historical Review, 101:3 (June 1996), pp. 749-70.
Bibliography
Bentley, Jerry, “Cross-Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World History”, The American Historical Review 101:3 (June 1996).
Dawley, Evan N., “Finding Meaning in Time and Space: Periodisation and Taiwanese-centric history”, International Journal of Taiwan Studies 1:2 (2018).
Di Cosmo, Nicola, “State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History”, Journal of World History 10:1 (Spring 1999).
Huang Fu-ch’ing 黄福慶, Qingmo liu Ri xuesheng 清末留日學生 [Chinese students in Japan during the late Qing dynasty], (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 1975).
McCord, Edward A., The Power of the Gun: The emergence of modern Chinese warlordism (University of California Press, 1993).
Millward, James A., “How ‘Chinese Dynasties’ Periodization Works with the ‘Tribute System’ and ‘Sinicization’ to Erase Diversity and Euphemize Colonialism in Historiography of China”, The Historical Journal 67:1 (2024).
Millward, James A., “We Need a New Approach to Teaching Modern Chinese History: We Have Lazily Repeated False Narratives for Too Long”. Medium (online blog accessed 16 July 2024).
Paine, Sarah C., The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, power, and primacy (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Schiffrin, Harold Z., Sun Yat-Sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution (University of California Press, 2020).
Spence, Jonathan D., The Search for Modern China (Norton: 1990).
Steinberg, Jonathan W., “Was the Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?” The Russian Review 67, no. 1 (2008).
Waley-Cohen, Joanna, “The New Qing History”, Radical History Review 88 (2004).